mirror of
https://github.com/pi-hole/dnsmasq.git
synced 2025-12-19 10:18:25 +00:00
Fix DNSSEC and DNAME.
Do the correct things to validate replies which include a DNAME record. Thanks to Graham Clinch for pointing this out.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
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'.' or NAME_ESCAPE then all would have to be escaped, so the
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presentation format would be twice as long as the spec. */
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daemon->keyname = safe_malloc((MAXDNAME * 2) + 1);
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daemon->cname = safe_malloc((MAXDNAME * 2) + 1);
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/* one char flag per possible RR in answer section (may get extended). */
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daemon->rr_status_sz = 64;
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daemon->rr_status = safe_malloc(sizeof(*daemon->rr_status) * daemon->rr_status_sz);
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@@ -1248,7 +1248,7 @@ extern struct daemon {
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char *namebuff; /* MAXDNAME size buffer */
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char *workspacename;
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#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
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char *keyname; /* MAXDNAME size buffer */
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char *keyname, *cname; /* MAXDNAME size buffer */
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unsigned long *rr_status; /* ceiling in TTL from DNSSEC or zero for insecure */
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int rr_status_sz;
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int dnssec_no_time_check;
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130
src/dnssec.c
130
src/dnssec.c
@@ -1942,11 +1942,13 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
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static unsigned char **targets = NULL;
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static int target_sz = 0;
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unsigned char *ans_start, *p1, *p2;
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int type1, class1, rdlen1 = 0, type2, class2, rdlen2, qclass, qtype, targetidx;
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int i, j, rc = STAT_INSECURE;
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unsigned char *ans_start, *p1, *p2, *p3;
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int type1, class1, rdlen1 = 0, type2, class2, rdlen2, qclass, qtype, targetidx, gotdname;
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int i, j, k, rc = STAT_INSECURE;
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int secure = STAT_SECURE;
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int rc_nsec;
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unsigned long ttl;
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/* extend rr_status if necessary */
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if (daemon->rr_status_sz < ntohs(header->ancount) + ntohs(header->nscount))
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{
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@@ -1993,27 +1995,119 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
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/* Can't validate an RRSIG query */
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if (qtype == T_RRSIG)
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return STAT_INSECURE;
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/* Find CNAME targets. */
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for (gotdname = i = 0; i < ntohs(header->ancount); i++)
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{
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if (!(p1 = skip_name(p1, header, plen, 10)))
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return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
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GETSHORT(type1, p1);
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GETSHORT(class1, p1);
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p1 += 4; /* TTL */
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GETSHORT(rdlen1, p1);
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if (type1 == T_DNAME)
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gotdname = 1;
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if (qtype != T_CNAME && qtype != T_ANY && type1 == T_CNAME && class1 == qclass)
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{
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if (!expand_workspace(&targets, &target_sz, targetidx))
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return STAT_BOGUS;
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targets[targetidx++] = p1; /* pointer to target name */
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}
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if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p1, plen, rdlen1))
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return STAT_BOGUS;
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}
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if (qtype != T_CNAME && qtype != T_ANY)
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for (j = ntohs(header->ancount); j != 0; j--)
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/* A DNAME capable of sythesising a CNAME means we don't need to validate the CNAME,
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we can just assume that it's valid. RFC 4035 3.2.3 */
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if (gotdname)
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for (p1 = ans_start, i = 0; i < ntohs(header->ancount); i++)
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{
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if (!(p1 = skip_name(p1, header, plen, 10)))
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if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p1, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 10))
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return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
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GETSHORT(type2, p1);
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p1 += 6; /* class, TTL */
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GETSHORT(rdlen2, p1);
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GETSHORT(type1, p1);
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GETSHORT(class1, p1);
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p1 += 4; /* TTL */
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GETSHORT(rdlen1, p1);
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if (type2 == T_CNAME)
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if (type1 != T_DNAME)
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{
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if (!expand_workspace(&targets, &target_sz, targetidx))
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if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p1, plen, rdlen1))
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return STAT_BOGUS;
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targets[targetidx++] = p1; /* pointer to target name */
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}
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if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p1, plen, rdlen2))
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return STAT_BOGUS;
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else
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{
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if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p1, keyname, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
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return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
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/* We now have the name of the DNAME in name, and the target in keyname.
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Look for any CNAMEs which could have been synthesised from this DNAME
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and pre-qualify them. */
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for (p2 = ans_start, j = 0; j < ntohs(header->ancount); j++)
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{
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if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p2, daemon->cname, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 10))
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return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
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GETSHORT(type2, p2);
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GETSHORT(class2, p2);
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GETLONG(ttl, p2);
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GETSHORT(rdlen2, p2);
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if (type2 != T_CNAME || class2 != class1)
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{
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if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p2, plen, rdlen2))
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return STAT_BOGUS;
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}
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else
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{
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size_t name_prefix_len = strlen(daemon->cname) - strlen(name);
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if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p2, daemon->workspacename, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
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return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
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/* We have the name of the CNAME in daemon->cname, and the target in daemon->workspacename.
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See if the CNAME was sythesised from the DNAME.
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CNAME must be <subdomain>.<dname>
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CNAME target must be <subdomain>.<dname_target>
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<subdomain>s must match for name and target. */
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if (hostname_issubdomain(name, daemon->cname) == 1 &&
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hostname_issubdomain(keyname, daemon->workspacename) == 1 &&
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name_prefix_len == strlen(daemon->workspacename) - strlen(keyname))
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{
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char save = daemon->cname[name_prefix_len];
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daemon->cname[name_prefix_len] = 0;
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daemon->workspacename[name_prefix_len] = 0;
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if (hostname_isequal(daemon->cname, daemon->workspacename))
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{
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/* pre-qualify this as validated */
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daemon->rr_status[j] = ttl > 0 ? ttl : 1;
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/* and remove it from the targets we need to have validated answers to. */
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if (class2 == qclass)
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{
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daemon->cname[name_prefix_len] = save;
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for (k = 0; k <targetidx; k++)
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if ((p3 = targets[k]))
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{
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int rc1;
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if (!(rc1 = extract_name(header, plen, &p3, daemon->cname, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 0)))
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return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
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if (rc1 == 1)
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targets[k] = NULL;
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}
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}
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}
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}
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}
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}
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}
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}
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for (p1 = ans_start, i = 0; i < ntohs(header->ancount) + ntohs(header->nscount); i++)
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@@ -2032,6 +2126,10 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
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/* Don't try and validate RRSIGs! */
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if (type1 == T_RRSIG)
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continue;
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/* Pre-validated by DNAME above don't validate. */
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if (daemon->rr_status[i] != 0)
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continue;
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/* Check if we've done this RRset already */
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for (p2 = ans_start, j = 0; j < i; j++)
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@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ int hostname_order(const char *a, const char *b)
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int hostname_isequal(const char *a, const char *b)
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{
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return hostname_order(a, b) == 0;
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return strlen(a) == strlen(b) && hostname_order(a, b) == 0;
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}
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/* is b equal to or a subdomain of a return 2 for equal, 1 for subdomain */
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