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Comprehensive spelling/typo fixes.

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Thanks to Josh Soref for generating these fixes.
This commit is contained in:
Josh Soref
2017-02-06 16:14:04 +00:00
committed by Simon Kelley
parent d42d4706bb
commit 730c6745f0
47 changed files with 214 additions and 214 deletions
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12
src/dnssec.c
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@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ static int verify(struct blockdata *key_data, unsigned int key_len, unsigned cha
character. In theory, if all the characters in a name were /000 or
'.' or NAME_ESCAPE then all would have to be escaped, so the
presentation format would be twice as long as the spec (1024).
The buffers are all delcared as 2049 (allowing for the trailing zero)
The buffers are all declared as 2049 (allowing for the trailing zero)
for this reason.
*/
static int to_wire(char *name)
@@ -670,7 +670,7 @@ static void sort_rrset(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, u16 *rr_desc, int
static unsigned char **rrset = NULL, **sigs = NULL;
/* Get pointers to RRset menbers and signature(s) for same.
/* Get pointers to RRset members and signature(s) for same.
Check signatures, and return keyname associated in keyname. */
static int explore_rrset(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, int class, int type,
char *name, char *keyname, int *sigcnt, int *rrcnt)
@@ -1467,7 +1467,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsi
if (offset < p[1] && (p[offset+2] & mask) != 0)
return 0;
break; /* finshed checking */
break; /* finished checking */
}
rdlen -= p[1];
@@ -1625,7 +1625,7 @@ static int check_nsec3_coverage(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, int dige
if (offset < p[1] && (p[offset+2] & mask) != 0)
return 0;
break; /* finshed checking */
break; /* finished checking */
}
rdlen -= p[1];
@@ -1910,7 +1910,7 @@ static int zone_status(char *name, int class, char *keyname, time_t now)
if (!(crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, keyname, now, F_DS)))
return STAT_NEED_DS;
/* F_DNSSECOK misused in DS cache records to non-existance of NS record.
/* F_DNSSECOK misused in DS cache records to non-existence of NS record.
F_NEG && !F_DNSSECOK implies that we've proved there's no DS record here,
but that's because there's no NS record either, ie this isn't the start
of a zone. We only prove that the DNS tree below a node is unsigned when
@@ -2128,7 +2128,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
/* An attacker replay a wildcard answer with a different
answer and overlay a genuine RR. To prove this
hasn't happened, the answer must prove that
the gennuine record doesn't exist. Check that here.
the genuine record doesn't exist. Check that here.
Note that we may not yet have validated the NSEC/NSEC3 RRsets.
That's not a problem since if the RRsets later fail
we'll return BOGUS then. */