A bug, introduced in 2.87, which could result in DNS
servers being removed from the configuration when reloading
server configuration from DBus, or re-reading /etc/resolv.conf
Only servers from the same source should be replaced, but some
servers from other sources (ie hard coded or another dynamic source)
could mysteriously disappear.
This gives dnsmasq the ability to originate retries for upstream DNS
queries itself, rather than relying on the downstream client. This is
most useful when doing DNSSEC over unreliable upstream network. It
comes with some cost in memory usage and network bandwidth.
Tweak things so that packets relayed towards a server
have source address on the server-facing network, not the
client-facing network. Thanks to Luis Thomas for spotting this
and initial patch.
forwarded queries to the configured or default value of
edns-packet-max. There's no point letting a client set a larger
value if we're unable to return the answer.
This change also removes a previous bug
where --dhcp-alternate-port would affect the port used
to relay _to_ as well as the port being listened on.
The new feature allows configuration to provide bug-for-bug
compatibility, if required. Thanks to Damian Kaczkowski
for the feature suggestion.
This allows hosts get a domain which relects the interface they
are attached to in a way which doesn't require hard-coding addresses.
Thanks to Sten Spans for the idea.
To be treated as hex, the pattern must consist of only hex digits AND
contain at least one ':'. Thanks to Bengt-Erik Sandstrom who tripped
over a pattern consisting of a decimal number which was interpreted
surprisingly.
The sharing point for DNSSEC RR data used to be when it entered the
cache, having been validated. After that queries requiring the KEY or
DS records would share the cached values. There is a common case in
dual-stack hosts that queries for A and AAAA records for the same
domain are made simultaneously. If required keys were not in the
cache, this would result in two requests being sent upstream for the
same key data (and all the subsequent chain-of-trust queries.) Now we
combine these requests and elide the duplicates, resulting in fewer
queries upstream and better performance. To keep a better handle on
what's going on, the "extra" logging mode has been modified to
associate queries and answers for DNSSEC queries in the same way as
ordinary queries. The requesting address and port have been removed
from DNSSEC logging lines, since this is no longer strictly defined.
This used to have a global limit, but that has a problem when using
different servers for different upstream domains. Queries which are
routed by domain to an upstream server which is not responding will
build up and trigger the limit, which breaks DNS service for all other
domains which could be handled by other servers. The change is to make
the limit per server-group, where a server group is the set of servers
configured for a particular domain. In the common case, where only
default servers are declared, there is no effective change.
This should be largely transparent, but it drastically
improves performance and reduces memory foot-print when
configuring large numbers domains of the form
local=/adserver.com/
or
local=/adserver.com/#
Lookup times now grow as log-to-base-2 of the number of domains,
rather than greater than linearly, as before.
The change makes multiple addresses associated with a domain work
address=/example.com/1.2.3.4
address=/example.com/5.6.7.8
It also handles multiple upstream servers for a domain better; using
the same try/retry alogrithms as non domain-specific servers. This
also applies to DNSSEC-generated queries.
Finally, some of the oldest and gnarliest code in dnsmasq has had
a significant clean-up. It's far from perfect, but it _is_ better.
Fix bug which caused dnsmasq to lose track of processes forked
to handle TCP DNS connections under heavy load. The code
checked that at least one free process table slot was
available before listening on TCP sockets, but didn't take
into account that more than one TCP connection could
arrive, so that check was not sufficient to ensure that
there would be slots for all new processes. It compounded
this error by silently failing to store the process when
it did run out of slots. Even when this bug is triggered,
all the right things happen, and answers are still returned.
Only under very exceptional circumstances, does the bug
manifest itself: see
https://lists.thekelleys.org.uk/pipermail/dnsmasq-discuss/2021q2/014976.html
Thanks to Tijs Van Buggenhout for finding the conditions under
which the bug manifests itself, and then working out
exactly what was going on.
Check sender of all received packets, as specified in RFC 1350 para 4.
My understanding of the example in the RFC is that it in fact only
applies to server-to-client packets, and packet loss or duplication
cannot result in a client sending from more than one port to a server.
This check is not, therefore, strictly needed on the server side.
It's still useful, and adds a little security against packet
spoofing. (though if you're running TFTP on a public network with
bad actors, nothing can really save you.)
Previously, without min-port or max-port configured, dnsmasq would
default to the compiled in defaults for those, which are 1024 and
65535. Now, when neither are configured, it defaults instead to
the kernel's ephemeral port range, which is typically
32768 to 60999 on Linux systems. This change eliminates the
possibility that dnsmasq may be using a registered port > 1024
when a long-running daemon starts up and wishes to claim it.
This change does likely slighly reduce the number of random ports
and therefore the protection from reply spoofing. The older
behaviour can be restored using the min-port and max-port config
switches should that be a concern.
CVE-2021-3448 applies.
It's possible to specify the source address or interface to be
used when contacting upstream nameservers: server=8.8.8.8@1.2.3.4
or server=8.8.8.8@1.2.3.4#66 or server=8.8.8.8@eth0, and all of
these have, until now, used a single socket, bound to a fixed
port. This was originally done to allow an error (non-existent
interface, or non-local address) to be detected at start-up. This
means that any upstream servers specified in such a way don't use
random source ports, and are more susceptible to cache-poisoning
attacks.
We now use random ports where possible, even when the
source is specified, so server=8.8.8.8@1.2.3.4 or
server=8.8.8.8@eth0 will use random source
ports. server=8.8.8.8@1.2.3.4#66 or any use of --query-port will
use the explicitly configured port, and should only be done with
understanding of the security implications.
Note that this change changes non-existing interface, or non-local
source address errors from fatal to run-time. The error will be
logged and communiction with the server not possible.
