By default 30 first servers are listed individually to system log, and
then a count of the remaining items. With e.g. a NXDOMAIN based adblock
service, dnsmasq lists 30 unnecessary ad sites every time when dnsmasq
evaluates the list. But the actual nameservers in use are evaluated last
and are not displayed as they get included in the "remaining items" total.
Handle the "local addresses only" separately and list only a few of them.
Remove the "local addresses only" from the general count.
This effectively reverts most of 51967f9807 ("SERVFAIL is an expected
error return, don't try all servers.") and 4ace25c5d6 ("Treat REFUSED (not
SERVFAIL) as an unsuccessful upstream response").
With the current behaviour, as soon as dnsmasq receives a SERVFAIL from an
upstream server, it stops trying to resolve the query and simply returns
SERVFAIL to the client. With this commit, dnsmasq will instead try to
query other upstream servers upon receiving a SERVFAIL response.
According to RFC 1034 and 1035, the semantic of SERVFAIL is that of a
temporary error condition. Recursive resolvers are expected to encounter
network or resources issues from time to time, and will respond with
SERVFAIL in this case. Similarly, if a validating DNSSEC resolver [RFC
4033] encounters issues when checking signatures (unknown signing
algorithm, missing signatures, expired signatures because of a wrong
system clock, etc), it will respond with SERVFAIL.
Note that all those behaviours are entirely different from a negative
response, which would provide a definite indication that the requested
name does not exist. In our case, if an upstream server responds with
SERVFAIL, another upstream server may well provide a positive answer for
the same query.
Thus, this commit will increase robustness whenever some upstream servers
encounter temporary issues or are misconfigured.
Quoting RFC 1034, Section 4.3.1. "Queries and responses":
If recursive service is requested and available, the recursive response
to a query will be one of the following:
- The answer to the query, possibly preface by one or more CNAME
RRs that specify aliases encountered on the way to an answer.
- A name error indicating that the name does not exist. This
may include CNAME RRs that indicate that the original query
name was an alias for a name which does not exist.
- A temporary error indication.
Here is Section 5.2.3. of RFC 1034, "Temporary failures":
In a less than perfect world, all resolvers will occasionally be unable
to resolve a particular request. This condition can be caused by a
resolver which becomes separated from the rest of the network due to a
link failure or gateway problem, or less often by coincident failure or
unavailability of all servers for a particular domain.
And finally, RFC 1035 specifies RRCODE 2 for this usage, which is now more
widely known as SERVFAIL (RFC 1035, Section 4.1.1. "Header section format"):
RCODE Response code - this 4 bit field is set as part of
responses. The values have the following
interpretation:
(...)
2 Server failure - The name server was
unable to process this query due to a
problem with the name server.
For the DNSSEC-related usage of SERVFAIL, here is RFC 4033
Section 5. "Scope of the DNSSEC Document Set and Last Hop Issues":
A validating resolver can determine the following 4 states:
(...)
Insecure: The validating resolver has a trust anchor, a chain of
trust, and, at some delegation point, signed proof of the
non-existence of a DS record. This indicates that subsequent
branches in the tree are provably insecure. A validating resolver
may have a local policy to mark parts of the domain space as
insecure.
Bogus: The validating resolver has a trust anchor and a secure
delegation indicating that subsidiary data is signed, but the
response fails to validate for some reason: missing signatures,
expired signatures, signatures with unsupported algorithms, data
missing that the relevant NSEC RR says should be present, and so
forth.
(...)
This specification only defines how security-aware name servers can
signal non-validating stub resolvers that data was found to be bogus
(using RCODE=2, "Server Failure"; see [RFC4035]).
Notice the difference between a definite negative answer ("Insecure"
state), and an indefinite error condition ("Bogus" state). The second
type of error may be specific to a recursive resolver, for instance
because its system clock has been incorrectly set, or because it does not
implement newer cryptographic primitives. Another recursive resolver may
succeed for the same query.
There are other similar situations in which the specified behaviour is
similar to the one implemented by this commit.
For instance, RFC 2136 specifies the behaviour of a "requestor" that wants
to update a zone using the DNS UPDATE mechanism. The requestor tries to
contact all authoritative name servers for the zone, with the following
behaviour specified in RFC 2136, Section 4:
4.6. If a response is received whose RCODE is SERVFAIL or NOTIMP, or
if no response is received within an implementation dependent timeout
period, or if an ICMP error is received indicating that the server's
port is unreachable, then the requestor will delete the unusable
server from its internal name server list and try the next one,
repeating until the name server list is empty. If the requestor runs
out of servers to try, an appropriate error will be returned to the
requestor's caller.
Some consider it good practice to obscure software version numbers to
clients. Compiling with -DNO_ID removes the *.bind info structure.
This includes: version, author, copyright, cachesize, cache insertions,
evictions, misses & hits, auth & servers.
Manual page: clarify that the --address and --ipset options take one or
more domains rather than just two. Clarify that --ipset puts addresses
in all ipsets, it is not a 1:1 mapping from addresses.
Also increase the width for options output in --help, some options were
truncated leading to confusing output. Almost all options and
descriptions are now within the 120 colums limit.
The check that there's enough space to store the DHCP agent-id
at the end of the packet could succeed when it should fail
if the END option is in either of the oprion-overload areas.
That could overwrite legit options in the request and cause
bad behaviour. It's highly unlikely that any sane DHCP client
would trigger this bug, and it's never been seen, but this
fixes the problem.
Also fix off-by-one in bounds checking of option processing.
Worst case scenario on that is a read one byte beyond the
end off a buffer with a crafted packet, and maybe therefore
a SIGV crash if the memory after the buffer is not mapped.
Thanks to Timothy Becker for spotting these.
From f3d832b41f44c856003517c583fbd7af4dca722c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Neil Jerram <Neil.Jerram@metaswitch.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Apr 2016 19:23:47 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Fix DHCPv4 reply via --bridge-interface alias interface
Sending a DHCPv4 reply through a --bridge-interface alias interface
was inadvertently broken by
commit 65c7212000
Author: Lung-Pin Chang <changlp@cs.nctu.edu.tw>
Date: Thu Mar 19 23:22:21 2015 +0000
dhcp: set outbound interface via cmsg in unicast reply
If multiple routes to the same network exist, Linux blindly picks
the first interface (route) based on destination address, which might not be
the one we're actually offering leases. Rather than relying on this,
always set the interface for outgoing unicast DHCP packets.
because in the aliasing case, iface_index is changed from the index of
the interface on which the packet was received, to be the interface
index of the 'bridge' interface (where the DHCP context is expected to
be defined, and so needs to be looked up).
For the cmsg code that the cited commit added, we need the original
iface_index; so this commit saves that off before the aliasing code
can change it, as rcvd_iface_index, and then uses rcvd_iface_index
instead of iface_index for the cmsg code.
