It's OK for NSEC records to be expanded from wildcards,
but in that case, the proof of non-existence is only valid
starting at the wildcard name, *.<domain> NOT the name expanded
from the wildcard. Without this check it's possible for an
attacker to craft an NSEC which wrongly proves non-existence
in a domain which includes a wildcard for NSEC.
RFC 4034 says:
[RFC2181] specifies that an RRset is not allowed to contain duplicate
records (multiple RRs with the same owner name, class, type, and
RDATA). Therefore, if an implementation detects duplicate RRs when
putting the RRset in canonical form, it MUST treat this as a protocol
error. If the implementation chooses to handle this protocol error
in the spirit of the robustness principle (being liberal in what it
accepts), it MUST remove all but one of the duplicate RR(s) for the
purposes of calculating the canonical form of the RRset.
We chose to handle this robustly, having found at least one recursive
server in the wild which returns duplicate NSEC records in the AUTHORITY
section of an answer generated from a wildcard record. sort_rrset() is
therefore modified to delete duplicate RRs which are detected almost
for free during the bubble-sort process.
Thanks to Toralf Förster for helping to diagnose this problem.
The current logic is naive in the case that there is more than
one RRset in an answer (Typically, when a non-CNAME query is answered
by one or more CNAME RRs, and then then an answer RRset.)
If all the RRsets validate, then they are cached and marked as validated,
but if any RRset doesn't validate, then the AD flag is not set (good) and
ALL the RRsets are cached marked as not validated.
This breaks when, eg, the answer contains a validated CNAME, pointing
to a non-validated answer. A subsequent query for the CNAME without do
will get an answer with the AD flag wrongly reset, and worse, the same
query with do will get a cached answer without RRSIGS, rather than
being forwarded.
The code now records the validation of individual RRsets and that
is used to correctly set the "validated" bits in the cache entries.
Fix heap overflow in DNS code. This is a potentially serious
security hole. It allows an attacker who can make DNS
requests to dnsmasq, and who controls the contents of
a domain, which is thereby queried, to overflow
(by 2 bytes) a heap buffer and either crash, or
even take control of, dnsmasq.
The list of exceptions to being able to locally answer
cached data for validated records when DNSSEC data is requested
was getting too long, so don't ever do that. This means
that the cache no longer has to hold RRSIGS and allows
us to lose lots of code. Note that cached validated
answers are still returned as long as do=0
Much gnarly special-case code removed and replaced with correct
general implementaion. Checking of zone-status moved to DNSSEC code,
where it should be, vastly simplifying query-forwarding code.
When we can validate a DS RRset, but don't speak the hash algo it
contains, treat that the same as an NSEC/3 proving that the DS
doesn't exist. 4025 5.2
