mirror of
https://github.com/pi-hole/dnsmasq.git
synced 2025-12-19 10:18:25 +00:00
417 lines
12 KiB
C
417 lines
12 KiB
C
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#include "dnsmasq.h"
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#include "dnssec-crypto.h"
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#include <assert.h>
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#define CHECKED_GETCHAR(var, ptr, len) do { \
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if ((len) < 1) return 0; \
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var = *ptr++; \
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(len) -= 1; \
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} while (0)
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#define CHECKED_GETSHORT(var, ptr, len) do { \
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if ((len) < 2) return 0; \
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GETSHORT(var, ptr); \
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(len) -= 2; \
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} while (0)
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#define CHECKED_GETLONG(var, ptr, len) do { \
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if ((len) < 4) return 0; \
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GETLONG(var, ptr); \
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(len) -= 4; \
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} while (0)
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#define SERIAL_UNDEF -100
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#define SERIAL_EQ 0
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#define SERIAL_LT -1
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#define SERIAL_GT 1
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/* Implement RFC1982 wrapped compare for 32-bit numbers */
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static int serial_compare_32(unsigned long s1, unsigned long s2)
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{
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if (s1 == s2)
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return SERIAL_EQ;
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if ((s1 < s2 && (s2 - s1) < (1UL<<31)) ||
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(s1 > s2 && (s1 - s2) > (1UL<<31)))
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return SERIAL_LT;
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if ((s1 < s2 && (s2 - s1) > (1UL<<31)) ||
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(s1 > s2 && (s1 - s2) < (1UL<<31)))
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return SERIAL_GT;
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return SERIAL_UNDEF;
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}
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/* Extract a DNS name from wire format, without handling compression. This is
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faster than extract_name() and does not require access to the full dns
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packet. */
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static int extract_name_no_compression(unsigned char *rr, int maxlen, char *buf)
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{
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unsigned char *start=rr, *end = rr+maxlen;
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int count;
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while (rr < end && *rr != 0)
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{
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count = *rr++;
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while (count-- > 0 && rr < end)
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{
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*buf = *rr++;
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if (!isascii(*buf) || iscntrl(*buf) || *buf == '.')
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return 0;
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if (*buf >= 'A' && *buf <= 'Z')
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*buf += 'a' - 'A';
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buf++;
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}
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*buf++ = '.';
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}
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// Remove trailing dot (if any)
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if (rr != start)
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*(--buf) = 0;
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rr++;
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if (rr == end)
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return 0;
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return rr-start;
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}
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/* Check whether today/now is between date_start and date_end */
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static int check_date_range(unsigned long date_start, unsigned long date_end)
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{
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/* TODO: double-check that time(0) is the correct time we are looking for */
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/* TODO: dnssec requires correct timing; implement SNTP in dnsmasq? */
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unsigned long curtime = time(0);
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/* We must explicitly check against wanted values, because of SERIAL_UNDEF */
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if (serial_compare_32(curtime, date_start) != SERIAL_GT)
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return 0;
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if (serial_compare_32(curtime, date_end) != SERIAL_LT)
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return 0;
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return 1;
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}
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/* Sort RRs within a RRset in canonical order, according to RFC4034, §6.3
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Notice that the RRDATA sections have been already normalized, so a memcpy
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is sufficient.
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NOTE: r1/r2 point immediately after the owner name. */
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static int rrset_canonical_order(const void *r1, const void *r2)
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{
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int r1len, r2len, res;
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const unsigned char *pr1=*(unsigned char**)r1, *pr2=*(unsigned char**)r2;
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pr1 += 8; pr2 += 8;
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GETSHORT(r1len, pr1); GETSHORT(r2len, pr2);
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/* Lexicographically compare RDATA (thus, if equal, smaller length wins) */
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res = memcmp(pr1, pr2, MIN(r1len, r2len));
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if (res == 0)
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{
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if (r1len < r2len)
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return -1;
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else
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/* NOTE: RFC2181 says that an RRset is not allowed to contain duplicate
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records. If it happens, it is a protocol error and anything goes. */
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return 1;
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}
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return res;
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}
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typedef struct PendingRRSIGValidation
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{
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VerifyAlgCtx *alg;
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char *signer_name;
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int keytag;
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} PendingRRSIGValidation;
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static int begin_rrsig_validation(struct dns_header *header, size_t pktlen,
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unsigned char *reply, int count, char *owner,
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int sigclass, int sigrdlen, unsigned char *sig,
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PendingRRSIGValidation *out)
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{
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int i, res;
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int sigtype, sigalg, siglbl;
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unsigned char *sigrdata = sig;
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unsigned long sigttl, date_end, date_start;
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unsigned char* p = reply;
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char* signer_name = daemon->namebuff;
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int keytag;
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void *rrset[16]; /* TODO: max RRset size? */
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int rrsetidx = 0;
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if (sigrdlen < 18)
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return 0;
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GETSHORT(sigtype, sig);
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sigalg = *sig++;
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siglbl = *sig++;
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GETLONG(sigttl, sig);
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GETLONG(date_end, sig);
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GETLONG(date_start, sig);
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GETSHORT(keytag, sig);
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sigrdlen -= 18;
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if (!verifyalg_supported(sigalg))
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{
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printf("RRSIG algorithm not supported: %d\n", sigalg);
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return 0;
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}
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if (!check_date_range(date_start, date_end))
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{
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printf("RRSIG outside date range\n");
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return 0;
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}
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/* Iterate within the answer and find the RRsets matching the current RRsig */
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for (i = 0; i < count; ++i)
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{
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int qtype, qclass, rdlen;
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if (!(res = extract_name(header, pktlen, &p, owner, 0, 10)))
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return 0;
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rrset[rrsetidx] = p;
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GETSHORT(qtype, p);
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GETSHORT(qclass, p);
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p += 4; /* skip ttl */
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GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
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if (res == 1 && qtype == sigtype && qclass == sigclass)
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{
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++rrsetidx;
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if (rrsetidx == countof(rrset))
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{
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/* Internal buffer too small */
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printf("internal buffer too small for this RRset\n");
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return 0;
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}
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}
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p += rdlen;
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}
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/* Sort RRset records in canonical order. */
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qsort(rrset, rrsetidx, sizeof(void*), rrset_canonical_order);
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/* Extract the signer name (we need to query DNSKEY of this name) */
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if (!(res = extract_name_no_compression(sig, sigrdlen, signer_name)))
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return 0;
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sig += res; sigrdlen -= res;
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/* Now initialize the signature verification algorithm and process the whole
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RRset */
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VerifyAlgCtx *alg = verifyalg_alloc(sigalg);
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if (!alg)
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return 0;
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if (!alg->vtbl->set_signature(alg, sig, sigrdlen))
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return 0;
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alg->vtbl->begin_data(alg);
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alg->vtbl->add_data(alg, sigrdata, 18);
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alg->vtbl->add_data(alg, signer_name, strlen(signer_name));
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for (i = 0; i < rrsetidx; ++i)
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{
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int rdlen;
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alg->vtbl->add_data(alg, owner, strlen(owner));
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alg->vtbl->add_data(alg, &sigtype, 2);
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alg->vtbl->add_data(alg, &sigclass, 2);
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alg->vtbl->add_data(alg, &sigttl, 4);
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p = (unsigned char*)(rrset[i]);
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p += 8;
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GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
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/* TODO: instead of a direct add_data(), we must call a RRtype-specific
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function, that extract and canonicalizes domain names within RDATA. */
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alg->vtbl->add_data(alg, p-2, rdlen+2);
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}
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alg->vtbl->end_data(alg);
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out->alg = alg;
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out->keytag = keytag;
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out->signer_name = signer_name;
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return 1;
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}
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static int end_rrsig_validation(PendingRRSIGValidation *val, struct crec *crec_dnskey)
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{
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return val->alg->vtbl->verify(val->alg, crec_dnskey->addr.key.keydata, crec_dnskey->uid);
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}
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static void dnssec_parserrsig(struct dns_header *header, size_t pktlen,
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unsigned char *reply, int count, char *owner,
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int sigclass, int sigrdlen, unsigned char *sig)
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{
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PendingRRSIGValidation val;
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/* Initiate the RRSIG validation process. The pending state is returned into val. */
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if (!begin_rrsig_validation(header, pktlen, reply, count, owner, sigclass, sigrdlen, sig, &val))
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return;
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printf("RRSIG: querying cache for DNSKEY %s (keytag: %d)\n", val.signer_name, val.keytag);
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/* Look in the cache for all the DNSKEYs with matching signer_name and keytag */
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char onekey = 0;
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struct crec *crecp = NULL;
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while (crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, val.signer_name, time(0), F_DNSKEY)) /* TODO: time(0) */
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{
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onekey = 1;
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if (crecp->addr.key.keytag != val.keytag)
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continue;
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if (crecp->addr.key.algo != verifyalg_algonum(val.alg))
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continue;
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printf("RRSIG: found DNSKEY %d in cache, attempting validation\n", val.keytag);
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if (end_rrsig_validation(&val, crecp))
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printf("Validation OK\n");
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else
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printf("Validation FAILED\n");
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}
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if (!onekey)
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{
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printf("DNSKEY not found, need to fetch it\n");
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/* TODO: store PendingRRSIGValidation in routing table,
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fetch key (and make it go through dnssec_parskey), then complete validation. */
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}
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}
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/* Compute keytag (checksum to quickly index a key). See RFC4034 */
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static int dnskey_keytag(unsigned char *rdata, int rdlen)
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{
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unsigned long ac;
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int i;
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ac = 0;
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for (i = 0; i < rdlen; ++i)
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ac += (i & 1) ? rdata[i] : rdata[i] << 8;
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ac += (ac >> 16) & 0xFFFF;
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return ac & 0xFFFF;
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}
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int dnssec_parsekey(struct dns_header *header, size_t pktlen, char *owner, unsigned long ttl,
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int rdlen, unsigned char *rdata)
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{
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int flags, proto, alg;
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struct keydata *key; struct crec *crecp;
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int explen, keytag;
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unsigned long exp;
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unsigned char *ordata = rdata; int ordlen = rdlen;
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CHECKED_GETSHORT(flags, rdata, rdlen);
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CHECKED_GETCHAR(proto, rdata, rdlen);
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CHECKED_GETCHAR(alg, rdata, rdlen);
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if (proto != 3)
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return 0;
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/* Skip non-signing keys (as specified in RFC4034 */
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if (!(flags & 0x100))
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return 0;
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switch (alg)
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{
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case 5: /* RSASHA1 */
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CHECKED_GETCHAR(explen, rdata, rdlen);
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if (explen == 0)
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{
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printf("DNSKEY: RSASHA1: Unsupported huge exponents\n");
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return 0;
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}
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if (rdlen < explen)
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return 0;
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key = keydata_alloc(rdata, rdlen);
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break;
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default:
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printf("DNSKEY: Unsupported algorithm: %d\n", alg);
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return 0;
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}
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/* TODO: time(0) is correct here? */
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crecp = cache_insert(owner, NULL, time(0), ttl, F_FORWARD | F_DNSKEY);
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if (crecp)
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{
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/* TODO: improve union not to name "uid" this field */
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crecp->uid = rdlen;
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crecp->addr.key.keydata = key;
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crecp->addr.key.algo = alg;
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crecp->addr.key.keytag = dnskey_keytag(ordata, ordlen);
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printf("DNSKEY: storing key for %s (keytag: %d)\n", owner, crecp->addr.key.keytag);
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}
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else
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{
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keydata_free(key);
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/* TODO: if insertion really might fail, verify we don't depend on cache
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insertion success for validation workflow correctness */
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printf("DNSKEY: cache insertion failure\n");
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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int dnssec_parseds(struct dns_header *header, size_t pktlen, char *owner, unsigned long ttl,
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int rdlen, unsigned char *rdata)
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{
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return 0;
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}
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int dnssec_validate(struct dns_header *header, size_t pktlen)
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{
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unsigned char *p, *reply;
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char *owner = daemon->namebuff;
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int i, qtype, qclass, rdlen;
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unsigned long ttl;
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if (header->ancount == 0)
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return 0;
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if (!(reply = p = skip_questions(header, pktlen)))
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return 0;
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/* First, process DNSKEY/DS records and add them to the cache. */
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cache_start_insert();
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for (i = 0; i < ntohs(header->ancount); i++)
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{
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if (!extract_name(header, pktlen, &p, owner, 1, 10))
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return 0;
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GETSHORT(qtype, p);
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GETSHORT(qclass, p);
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GETLONG(ttl, p);
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GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
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if (qtype == T_DS)
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{
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printf("DS found\n");
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dnssec_parseds(header, pktlen, owner, ttl, rdlen, p);
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}
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else if (qtype == T_DNSKEY)
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{
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printf("DNSKEY found\n");
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dnssec_parsekey(header, pktlen, owner, ttl, rdlen, p);
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}
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p += rdlen;
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}
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cache_end_insert();
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/* After we have cached DNSKEY/DS records, start looking for RRSIGs.
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We want to do this in a separate step because we want the cache
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to be already populated with DNSKEYs before parsing signatures. */
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p = reply;
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for (i = 0; i < ntohs(header->ancount); i++)
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{
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if (!extract_name(header, pktlen, &p, owner, 1, 10))
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return 0;
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GETSHORT(qtype, p);
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GETSHORT(qclass, p);
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GETLONG(ttl, p);
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GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
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if (qtype == T_RRSIG)
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{
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printf("RRSIG found\n");
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/* TODO: missing logic. We should only validate RRSIGs for which we
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have a valid DNSKEY that is referenced by a DS record upstream.
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There is a memory vs CPU conflict here; should we validate everything
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to save memory and thus waste CPU, or better first acquire all information
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(wasting memory) and then doing the minimum CPU computations required? */
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dnssec_parserrsig(header, pktlen, reply, ntohs(header->ancount), owner, qclass, rdlen, p);
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}
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p += rdlen;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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